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Mark Selden, editor of The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, wears many hats, among them, friend of
the blog to China Beat. So we are delighted to have the opportunity to reprint his essay, “China’s
Way Forward? Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Hegemony and the World
Economy in Crisis.” You can read the original essay and many others at the Asia-Pacific Journal
website.
By Mark Selden
2008—Annus Horribilis for the world economy—produced successive food, energy and financial crises,
initially devastating particularly the global poor, but quickly extending to the commanding heights of
the US and core economies and ushering in the sharpest downturn since the 1930s depression.
As all nations strive to respond to the financial gridlock that began in the United States and quickly
sent world industrial production and trade plummeting, there has been much discussion of the ability
of the high-flying Chinese economy to weather the storm, of the prospects for the intertwined US and
Chinese economies, even of the potential for China to rise to a position of regional or global primacy.
The present article critically explores these possibilities.
In “China’s Way Forward,” [1] James Fallows offers an astute ground’s eye assessment of that nation’s
economic prospects and reflects comparatively on the experience of the United States, Japan and
others in the teeth of the storm of 2008-09. Beginning with compelling images of migrant workers in
their millions returning to the countryside where they face protracted unemployment while container
ships sit idle in port, Fallows explains why China’s industrialization and export-dependent economy will
be hard hit by the looming world depression. He believes, however, that China will not only weather
the storm, but is likely to emerge stronger from it.
History can provide important clues to future possibilities. Financial specialist Michael Pettis has
compared China today with the 1920s when the US, taking advantage of World I, transformed its
substantial trade deficit and became the workshop of the world and a major creditor nation. The inflow
of gold paid for US agricultural and industrial goods driving the US economy. [2] When the depression
struck in the 1930s, the US was harder hit by unemployment than many others, including Europe and
Japan, yet it emerged from depression and war as the global hegemon. The geopolitics of war would
uniquely worked to US advantage in the first half of the twentieth century, but only then, in fueling
industrial advance, in decimating all major rivals, and in extending the US reach through military
bases. China today, with burgeoning industry and a huge trade surplus, but five times the trade
dependency of the US in the 1930s, faces the daunting prospect of industrial implosion, declining
exports and spiraling unemployment. How will China respond? And with what effect on others,
particularly the United States, in light of US-China economic and financial interdependence?
China’s trade surplus continued to grow even as its exports fell dramatically between December 2008
and February 2009. As economist Brad Setser documents, that surplus facilitated further purchase of
US Treasuries and securities [3] even as China’s Premier Wen Jiabao warned the United States of its
need to protect the value of China’s investment against the declining value of the dollar. It is precisely
China’s competitively priced exports, now including a strong array of technologically sophisticated high
end manufactures, together with its Treasury and agency purchases, which have allowed the US to
continue its profligate debtor ways. Or, viewed conversely, the US market was critical to China’s
industrial advance. For its part, the US now calls on China to reduce its deficit by revaluing its
currency and consuming more. The real worry for both, however, is that a surge of protectionism at a
time of recession—signs already emerging in spring 2009—would irreparably damage both nations and
the global economy. It could, more ominously, touch off a protectionist wave leading the way
eventually to hostilities and war.

Fallows believes that China will not only weather the storm but may emerge from it stronger than
before. He offers several reasons: Unlike deficit nations such as the US, China has vast surpluses and
it is vigorously allocating part of them to boost production and reduce unemployment. Indeed, not
only is China vigorously promoting construction that will boost employment, it has also embarked on
massive labor retraining programs. As Keith Bradsher reported, this year Guangdong province alone
has begun to implement three-to-six month training programs to train 4 million workers. [4] Many of
them combine training with part-time work in factories that are expected to hire them. The low wages
paid to trainees are part of a process that is driving down wages so that China will be more
competitive when export markets again expand. Nevertheless, the short-term prospects are bleak.
China’s manufactures, by World Bank reckoning, account for 33% of GDP, so declining output and
exports quickly bring substantial job losses. Significantly, China, the world’s number one steel
producer faces plummeting production and exports in 2009. China’s Iron and Steel Association on
March 18 projected an 80% fall in 2009 steel exports on top of a 6% drop in 2008. [5] US steel
production in the first three and a half months of 2009 fell by 52.8% to 22.5 million tons, with a
capacity utilization rate of 42.9% compared with 90.5% in 2008. 6] The critical issue is not, however,
whether Chinese investment in industry and training will solve the immediate problem of
unemployment. It will hinge on whether these measures simply fuel overproduction leading to
sharpening international conflict, or whether investment and retraining of workers can be directed to
new industries and technologies that can thrive when economic recovery begins by showing the way
toward more environmentally friendly and less destructive forms of development while creating jobs.
Fallows emphasizes Chinese inventiveness, and entrepreneurship, comparing the Chinese national
mood to that of a recovering Europe in the 1950s when everything seemed possible. His buoyant
views of Chinese entrepreneurship are best illustrated by the case of BYD Battery, a firm whose
horizons are not only dynamic but also green. Based in Shenzhen, BYD rose from a household
enterprise within a decade to become the world’s leading battery producer. It is now investing heavily
in technology that it hopes will drive the cleaner cars of the future. Indeed, it has begun producing its
own plug-in electric car and anticipates international sales in the near future.
Fallows is at his best in drawing on interviews to convey a sense of that nation’s entrepreneurial
energies. To assess China’s prospects within the sweep of the history of capitalism in general and of
East Asia in particular, consider the observations of Giovanni Arrighi in a recent interview and his
major works. [7] Building on Braudel and Marx, Arrighi observes that the US sequence of
deindustrialization and financial expansion since the 1970s, culminating in the crash of 2007-09, is
characteristic of the autumn of hegemonic systems. Analyzing five centuries of the geopolitics of
capitalism and empire, Arrighi highlights the recurrent pattern of financialization giving rise to a period
of chaos and the emergence of a new hegemon. Could China—or perhaps a greater East Asia region—
emerge to reshape the world economy in the new millennium? Or, to the contrary, might the US
restore its hegemonic position through astute reforms leading to new technological breakthroughs and
a sounder financial order? Would transition through a world depression be smooth, or would a new
order emerge out of the ruins of economic and financial implosion, protracted class struggles or wars?
Arrighi shares Fallows’ appreciation of Chinese strengths and energies. Drawing critically on the work
of the economic historian Sugihara Kaoru on the “industrious revolution” in Europe and East Asia, he
notes the specific character of China’s partial proletarianization, which lies behind its dramatic surge of
production and export-driven development. Central to this understanding is the dynamic role played
by the more than 130 million migrant workers who have fueled China’s low-wage industrialization
while retaining land ownership rights in their villages while working, some for decades, in the cities. If
China’s migrant workers share much in common with the tens of millions of undocumented workers in
the US, including vulnerability to arrest and deportation (from the cities, not across national borders)
during periods of economic downturn, there are important differences. Working in the cities but denied
the benefits associated with urban citizenship by dint of their rural household registration, many
migrants display an entrepreneurial ethos. Indeed, China’s household contract system guarantees
equal land shares for rural (including migrant) people, a system that preserves household cultivation
rights for all villagers, thus dodging the bullet confronting the scores of millions of landless farmers in
other developing countries. The system, with links to the earlier household plots which complemented
collective agriculture, provides more than a haven in hard times. Its importance becomes apparent in
periods of downturn as a fallback against starvation, but its household-centered character also

provides a breeding ground for the petty entrepreneurship that has been among the driving forces of
China’s economy since the 1970s.
Far from mythologizing China’s inexorable rise to preeminence, however, Arrighi draws attention to
the stability of world structures of inequality, which have preserved the dominance of the North over
the South since the nineteenth century with little change in relative per capita incomes. For all the
growth and income gains of recent decades, China’s per capita income remains low compared with
that of core countries. Indeed, Arrighi finds that China’s per capita income grew only from 2% to 4%
of that of the wealthy nations (more, of course, in PPP terms). And, if we exclude China, the position
of the nations of the South has actually declined in relative terms since the 1980s; with China
included, it has risen only slightly. This underlines both the extraordinary stability of the world order of
inequality and how far China is from a position of equity, not to speak of preeminence.
If there has been significant upward mobility over the last half century as measured by per capita
GDP, its primary locus has not been China but the East Asia region, led by Japan and including the
Newly Industrializing Economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong as well as China.
From this perspective, a rising China is far from achieving a position of primacy, even in Asia, not to
speak of the world. It will not reach the commanding heights in economic, technological or income
terms any time soon. And, despite systematic military buildup in recent decades, and even recognizing
the vulnerability of the vast American structure of bases, battleships, and nuclear bombs, as indicated
by US stalemate and defeat in successive wars, China is unlikely to be able to project its military
power decisively on a global or even a regional scale. [8]
The more interesting possibilities, certainly in the short to medium term, center on the rise of East
Asia. But can the region respond effectively to the contemporary economic and financial crisis? More
important, can it overcome historical and political differences, including conflicting understandings of
war and colonialism and deep divisions between its two most powerful nations, China and Japan, to
construct a new regional- or eventually world economic order? The challenges of any attempt to do so
are illustrated by the heavy inter-national strains that Europe and the Euro face in the context of world
depression despite the institutional strengths and accomplishments of the European Union. In
economic terms, a critical issue is whether China, Japan and other East Asian nations will achieve preeminence in the new green technologies that will critically shape the economies of the future. What is
certain is that, while regions have risen and fallen over the centuries, there has been no regional as
opposed to national hegemony in historical capitalism to date, an outcome precluded by inter-state
conflicts.
It is necessary, moreover, to consider the internal problems confronting China. Fallows, along with
many contemporary analysts, notes the proliferation of popular struggles in recent decades, but
dismisses the possibility of intense social conflict or revolutionary change in China in the face of
economic crisis. While recognizing the potential instability that could arise from large-scale
unemployment and falling incomes, he emphasizes the fact that worker and villager discontent has
addressed specific grievances, rather than targeting the system or the state. Such a perspective
slights both the legacies of history and the significance of strikes and protests that shape societies
without precipitating a revolutionary rupture, as in the US in the 1930s and many nations in the
1960s.
It is critical, in particular, to recall that in the course of the last two centuries, China, has repeatedly
been in the eye of the world storm of rebellion and revolution. Indeed, it has perhaps the world’s
longest and most fully developed tradition of rebellion and regime change from below of any nation.
As Arrighi and Binghamton colleagues in the World Labor Group documented, the twentieth century
was marked by two massive waves of worker and/or national insurgency, prior to and following the
two world wars, giving rise to both national independence and revolutionary movements and
transforming the social balance, with China figuring prominently in each. [9] Particularly if economic
turmoil leads to regional and global wars, the possibility of tumultuous class struggle should not be
ruled out for China, Asia, or other regions.
In the face of rising challenges from below, in recent years the Chinese state, with an accent on
stability, has demonstrated uncanny ability to limit protest by preventing horizontal alliances, keeping

protesters isolated, and channeling most protest into the legal system. [10] But it has done so while
riding the wave of economic growth, mobility, and rising prosperity since the 1970s. In the face of
world depression, the Chinese state has moved far more boldly than the United States or any
industrialized nation to create jobs through funding construction and fostering new industries. Equally
important, as Wang Shaoguang has documented, there is evidence that the current Chinese
leadership has begun to reconstruct the welfare and health safety net that was largely swept aside in
China, as in England and the US, in recent decades: through a basic income program, health care and
pension programs, for example. [11] These measures, together, suggest the kinds of flexible response
that the Chinese state is capable of mounting in the face of challenges from below.
China nevertheless confronts three formidable immediate and long-term hurdles above and beyond
the current world overproduction and financial crisis. The first of these is the specter of famine. North
and Northwest China are in the midst of the most severe drought in at least half a century, with
precipitation levels 70-90% below normal and water tables ruinously depleted from excessive well
drilling. The FAO’s 2009 report on “Crop Prospects and Food Situation” indicates that 9.5 million
hectares of winter wheat in seven provinces have been severely affected by drought. [12] In this
respect, China shares with other developing nations acute problems of hunger and poverty. Here, too,
proactive state policies will be essential if the disaster is to be mitigated. Nevertheless, while the
problems are acute, China’s financial and institutional resources appear to be greater than those of
many other, and particularly developing, nations. [13]
Perhaps most challenging in the long run is whether China can shift gears to an environmentally
sustainable development course. Thus far, with World Bank and US plaudits, it has followed the path
of earlier developers to achieve rapid sustained growth but at a price of an environmentally disastrous
combination of toxic industrialization, construction of the world’s largest dams, heavy reliance on coaland oil-driven production, and mass automobilization. Cumulatively, these have taken an immense toll
on land, water, and air. If China’s reckless development trajectory followed in the footsteps of earlier
pioneers such as the US and Japan, the environmental consequences have been graver. All signs point
toward a leadership that remains deeply committed to pursuit of mega engineering projects for
damming and water diversion with potentially dire consequences not only for the Chinese earth and
Chinese people, but for China’s neighbors in Southeast Asia threatened by water diversion. China may
eventually join an emerging consensus that prioritizes green technology and even, perhaps, begins to
rein in the God of Growth . . . but with its vast legions of rural poor, this will not be any time soon.
Whether China, as exemplified by BYD’s green automotive production can become a pioneer in the
emerging new industry remains to be seen.
A second challenge is the specter of rising inequality. In the course of three decades of rapid
development, China’s developmental priorities transformed a highly egalitarian income distribution
pattern into one of the world’s most skewed distributions, with class, city-countryside and ethnic
divisions all pronounced. This structurally determined outcome coincided, moreover, with the
dismantling of the nation’s extensive welfare network. [14] Can this genie be put back in the bottle?
The state’s recent proactive welfare policies, if deepened and sustained, could help. Strikingly, US
programs, and not only its bailouts for billionaires, thus far ignore issue of inequality in a nation in
which income inequality soared and the welfare structure was evicerated in the same years that
China’s did.
Arrighi argues in light of the history of capitalist transitions and financialization that US hegemony
entered its twilight in the 1970s and reached its terminal phase with the collapse of the financial and
real estate bubble in 2008, a conclusion made inevitable by the earlier transition from industrial to
financial primacy and the neo-liberal regime that gave the latter free rein. Perhaps . . . Yet, while
recognizing the formidable problems confronting the Obama administration, in the absence of a
serious contender in the form of a new hegemon, whether a nation or a region, such a conclusion
seems at least premature. The strengthening of the dollar in the face of the US financial meltdown and
huge deficits, and the Obama administration’s attempts to launch the next wave of US growth on
green foundations, suggest possible policy alternatives that could help to restore American economic
preeminence and prevent, or at least forestall, the imminent demise of its hegemonic power. We
should not rule out such possibilities, in particular a protracted muddling through in which the US
remains indisputably the most powerful among rival powers for the foreseeable future. This could take

place even under circumstances in which attempts to bail out the nearly bankrupt financial sector
show few signs of gaining traction, in which a continued war in Iraq and an expanding war in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, together with the stable growth both of the military budget and the global
network of military bases, are emblematic of US vulnerability rather than of hegemony.
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